War with Russia: A catastrophe with an announcement
By Prof Dr. Johannes Varwick
Disclaimer: This blog entry is republished with the friendly approval of the author. It was first published on the website of our "Institutional Member" zebis/Positionen where it is also available in German language.
The European peace order lies in ruins. In its aims and means, Russia's war against Ukraine is a breach of civilization that will change international politics on many levels. At the beginning of December 2021, together with two dozen former high-ranking military officers, ambassadors and scientists from the "transatlantic mainstream", I published the call "Get out of the spiral of escalation"[1], the key points of which seem to come from a different era today. February 24th, 2022 at the latest has pushed the ground out of these considerations a bit, but I still take this opportunity to reflect on some of my experiences with it.
In view of the already foreseeable escalation of the situation, we asked ourselves at the time whether we should stick to this fragile status quo in relation to Russia, or whether we really needed a new political attempt to defuse the explosive situation. Our real political starting point was: Russia's threatening gestures towards Ukraine are unacceptable, but outrage and formulaic condemnations do not lead us any further. Rather, realpolitik is now indicated. A policy based primarily on moral outrage and deterrence cannot be successful. Economic pressure and the tightening of sanctions have so far not been able to persuade Russia to turn back. None of this should be understood as an excuse for the West to stand by and accept the intensification of the escalation. Rather, NATO should actively approach Russia and work towards a de-escalation of the situation.
We then called for a fourfold political approach: A high-level conference in which the goal of revitalizing the European security architecture should be discussed without preconditions and in different formats and levels. Refraining from stationing additional troops and building infrastructure on both sides of the Russian Federation's border with its western neighbors, as well as full mutual transparency in military maneuvers, revitalizing talks at the military level and reviving the NATO-Russia dialogue as well as a new approach to European arms control and finally further offers of economic cooperation with Russia.
Our logic was to create win-win situations that should overcome the blockade at the time. This included - and this was always the core argument - the recognition of the security interests of both sides. With this in mind, a freeze should be agreed for the duration of the proposed conference on questions of future membership in NATO, the EU and the CSTO.
There was a wide range of responses to this call and hundreds of letters, dozens of discussion forums and interviews. There was agreement from those who have always been very close to Russian positions and criticism from my transatlantic mainstream friends. At the latest when I published an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on January 19, 2022 under the title "The West must build a bridge for Russia", some of the co-signatories also distanced themselves from the call. My argument there was as follows: We should think about accepting 'Russian zones of influence' and deny Ukraine any prospects of joining NATO.
With the proposals for a new security treaty presented shortly before Christmas 2021, the Russian perspective was clearly articulated. To respond blindly to this would mean accepting the 'zones of influence thinking' created by military force and abandoning the principles of the 1990 Charter of Paris. That couldn't be a sustainable way. After all, the principle of territorial integrity is of strategic importance for stability in Europe. And it is also true that Russia should not use threats and violence to successfully bind its self-defined zones of influence to itself, but rather act with soft power, i.e. the attractiveness of its own political and economic model. But blindly rejecting the Russian proposals would be just as wrong. To accommodate Russia on this central point and to deliberately put Ukraine's prospects of joining NATO on hold for the time being - and thus to revise our own decisions from 2008 - would in this respect violate principles, but if the alternative is a spiral of escalation from which we cannot come out, then we should do what diplomacy has to do: forge painful compromises, reconcile interests and try to prevent the worst.
Incidentally, that would not mean leaving Ukraine in the lurch (for whom no one in the West would militarily fight), but it would mean that we should talk to Ukraine, to Russia, to the USA and to the European states about what place Ukraine and Russia can have in the European security landscape. There were ideas on the table, such as a 'Finlandization' of Ukraine, i.e. neutrality, however spelled out.
Today, and in the face of Russian saber-rattling, all this sounds like all too dirty Realpolitik. But lamenting this emotionally does not bring the necessary political dynamism to get out of the dangerous spiral of escalation. I therefore considered more radical steps and the questioning of the previously valid principles and strategies to be necessary, especially since the West and NATO can act and negotiate on the basis of their own strength or the assured deterrence capability of their own alliance area.
There was no majority among those who signed the call. One of the co-signatories, the former General Inspector of the German Armed Forces Klaus Naumann, wrote in a letter to the editor of the FAZ that although he understands my efforts to engage in dialogue, I was now going too far in my willingness to accommodate Russia. Partners do not negotiate with each other if one of them, in this case Russia, wants to sign a signature at gunpoint.[2] I wrote back to him as follows: “In the FAZ article I argued that we should by no means blindly accept the Russian proposals, but we shouldn't blindly reject them either. I also prefaced that I consider the current Russian behavior to be unacceptable. In essence, I wanted to bring another thought into the debate in addition to these obvious things - and here it is possible that we have different perspectives: A willingness on the part of the West, cleverly played diplomatically, to accept Ukraine's move into NATO, as perceived in Russia (even if that is in fact not scheduled today) could be the starting point for serious negotiations. In these talks, the West would have to safeguard its core interests, but a bridge to Russia, as it is now, is also needed. I continue to believe that this is an imperative of sober realpolitik and in this respect the argument, which is strong in itself, that you do not negotiate with a gun at the head, does not fully hold.”
I still stand by this idea and even if there are now many to suggest that a reconciliation of interests was not possible with Putin, the goal was entirely reasonable. The West should have ruled out the question of Ukraine's NATO membership more clearly. There are omissions on all sides and as a result we see a failure of diplomacy. Of course you can say now that there was a Russian screenplay that was clear from the start. In that sense, it was naïve to assume that Russia's position could still be influenced. However, I am convinced that there was a window in which a reconciliation of interests could have been achieved. Things turned out differently now, and historians will decide who bears what responsibility.
Certainly identity issues are always the most dangerous and the most difficult to resolve in international politics. But different concepts of order are not the exception in international relations, but rather the rule. We don't know what would have happened if we had negotiated smarter. But as a result we see a failure on all levels and we shouldn't just look for the fault from the others. We should also be self-critical.
The Russian behavior does not really facilitate self-criticism. It is certainly true that Russia's imperial aspirations have been evident since 2008 at the latest. But we should have framed it better. There was too little recognition that Ukraine is a special case and a core issue of vital interest from a Russian perspective. Actually, everyone could have seen that, and then there would have been only two options: Either one would have had to protect Ukraine more radically and tear it to the western camp, as the Americans wanted do in 2008 - in other words, NATO membership and the willingness to fight for Ukraine. Then there would already have been a harsh Cold War back then, which would have become hot with a relatively high probability. The second option would have been to accept a buffer zone or a neutral Ukraine as the key to the solution. They were not willing to explore this path of straightening the front in real politics because the existence of zones of influence was taboo and respective own principles were fundamental on both sides.
I wasn't concerned with a new Yalta and the division of Europe, as was often assumed, but with the recognition of a real political situation. A stable and balanced buffer zone between two spheres of interest is always better than a long-term escalation with a potentially catastrophic outcome for every party involved.
What will happen now? After the military intervention on February 24, 2022, Russia will pay a hard price for the sanctions imposed and will continue to radicalize itself domestically. However, the hour will soon come to think about how to get down from this tree. A permanent escalation cannot be the solution. So we have to freeze the conflict, thereby stabilizing the situation and intellectually preparing for better times. This is not happening at all in western politics at the moment. One acts as if sanctions would solve the problem. But that's just where the problem begins, because a state that's been hit to the core won't play by our rules.
When choosing your strategy, you have to consider what options you have and what resources you are willing to use. Whichever way you look at it: Ukraine is in the Russian sphere of influence as long as we are not prepared to go to war for them, so now quickly accept them into NATO and then make an Article 5 case out of it. By the way, rightly so, because then a nuclear escalation would threaten. Only gentler means remain. They are all not nice for Ukraine, no question about it. But of all the options, stabilization through a neutral status would still be the best, ultimately also for Ukraine. To pretend that the western way has been successful so far is just as naïve as the accusation that my position is ultimately naïve. We shouldn't think in these extreme positions, but take a clear look at what we can still do with this very unpleasant situation.
Nevertheless, the old concept of containment must now be re-activated. This means that we must strengthen NATO's eastern flank and, with deterrence, show Putin his limits. It is clear that Ukraine is beyond this limit. The task now is to protect NATO members in the east. We will now experience an ice age that will last for months or years. It is to be hoped that there will soon be a need to negotiate with Russia again, for example on arms control or unintended escalations. During the Cold War, too, we had to maintain contacts with the Soviet Union, although we didn't like it.
A complete severance of the relations at all levels will certainly not help us. Russia is a nuclear power and that is a serious escalation scenario. If Putin's strategy fails, he will resort to other measures, and the final step could be nuclear war. So we have to think this war through to the end and not get into a permanent escalation with Russia.
Footnotes
[1] https://www.johannes-varwick.de/rauf/AUFRUF_Raus-aus-der-Eskalationsspirale_05122021-3.pdf
[2] https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/briefe-an-die-herausgeber/leserbriefe-vom-20-januar-2022-17739911.html
Credits: Photo by Kelly Sikkema on Unsplash [cropped]